2013年联邦大选后，左党（LP）有三个令人满意的理由。首先，它保持了其在德国东部第三大政党的地位（在某些州是第二大政党）。其次，到2013年，德国已经在德国西部大举进军选举，清除了几次州选举中的5％障碍，并且在联邦选举中也增加了在西方国家的选票份额。最后，随着社民党加入另一个大联盟，绿党落后于LP的投票总数，而FDP未能进入议会，LP扮演了新的角色，成为联邦议院的主要反对党。相比之下，进入2017年联邦大选的LP显然还没有解决。在2016年梅克伦堡前波美拉尼亚州和萨克森-安哈尔特州的州选举中，该党在选举中遭受了巨大损失，后者的选票下降到16.3％，前者的选票下降到13.2％。同时，在这两次选举中，“德国替代方案”（AfD）分别飙升至24.2％和20.8％。选举后的分析显示，尽管大多数非洲发展基金会的选民来自以前的非选民和不满意的基民盟选民，但也有相当多的人弃用了LP投票支持非洲发展基金会（Abdi-Herrle，Venohr和Blickle，2017年）。对于有限合伙人而言，AfD的崛起已经开始代表着生存威胁。因此，LP在2017年的选举中有两个主要目标：通过实现2009年的两位数结果来显示坚实的选举支持；尽管可以肯定，国防部将在议会中有代表，但要成为最大的小党派，如果可能的话，在另一个大联盟的情况下，保持其最大反对党的地位（Deggerich 2017）。可以肯定的是，尽管有限党一直将目光投向继续反对默克尔和基民盟，但它并没有完全排除红绿绿政府的可能性。在竞选初期，马丁·舒尔茨（Martin Schulz）处于优势地位，并且似乎至少有外部机会让默克尔（Mork）入座– SPD和LP就此进行了一些初步讨论。但是2017年春季的萨尔州大选（社会民主党未能如期表现）阻止了这一势头。据斯特凡·利比奇，在柏林国家政治的领军人物和LP中一个突出的实用主义者，社民党“刚刚失去了神经”的认真讨论红 - 红 - 绿（Deggerich 2017）。此外，尽管以Dietmar Bartsch为代表的LP务实派的改良派继续暗示左翼联盟至少在可能性范围之内，但党的更正统派的声音Sarah Wagenknecht却不断地开枪LP的潜在联盟伙伴认为，SPD必须先采取“柯宾式转向”，转向更传统的左翼计划，然后才能将联盟摆上桌面。林克 他们认为，在联盟成立之前，社民党需要采取“科尔宾式”转向更传统的左翼计划。林克 他们认为，在联盟成立之前，社民党需要采取“科尔宾式”转向更传统的左翼计划。林克
After the 2013 federal election the Left Party (LP) had three good reasons to be satisfied. First, it had maintained its status as the third largest party in eastern Germany (and in some states, the second largest). Second, by 2013 it had made substantial electoral inroads in western Germany, clearing the 5 per cent hurdle in several state elections and increasing its share of the vote in the west in the federal election as well. Finally, with the SPD joining in another grand coalition, the Greens falling behind the LP’s vote total, and the FDP failing to gain entry to parliament, the LP relished a new role as the leading opposition party in the Bundestag. Coming into the 2017 federal election, in contrast, the LP had clearly been unsettled. In state elections in 2016 in MecklenburgWest Pomerania and in Saxony-Anhalt, the party suffered huge election losses, falling to 16.3 per cent of the vote in the latter and to 13.2 per cent in the former. Meanwhile, the ‘Alternative for Germany’ (AfD) rocketed to 24.2 and 20.8 per cent in these two elections respectively. Post-election analyses revealed that while most AfD voters came from previous non-voters and from disaffected CDU voters, a significant number also deserted the LP to vote for the AfD (Abdi-Herrle, Venohr, and Blickle 2017). For the LP, the AfD’s rise had started to represent an existential threat. The LP therefore had two main goals for the 2017 election: to demonstrate solid electoral support by achieving a double-digit result as it had in 2009; and, despite the certainty that the AfD would be represented in parliament, to be the largest of the small parties and, if possible, retain its status as the largest opposition party in the case of another grand coalition (Deggerich 2017). To be sure, although it had set its sights on continuing to be a fundamental opposition to Merkel and the CDU, the LP did not entirely foreclose the possibility of a red–red–green government. During the early stages of the campaign – when Martin Schulz was in the ascendancy and appeared to have at least an outside chance to unseat Merkel – the SPD and LP conducted some preliminary discussions on this. But the Saarland state election in the spring of 2017 (where the Social Democrats failed to perform as expected) had halted this momentum. According to Stefan Liebich, a leading figure in Berlin state politics and a prominent pragmatist within the LP, the SPD ‘just lost its nerve’ for seriously discussing red– red–green (Deggerich 2017). Moreover, while the reformist, pragmatic wing of the LP represented by Dietmar Bartsch continued to suggest that a left-wing coalition was at least within the realm of possibility, Sarah Wagenknecht – the voice of the more orthodox wing of the party – constantly took shots at the LP’s potential coalition partners, arguing that before a coalition could be on the table the SPD would need to take a ‘Corbyn turn’ towards a more traditional left-wing programme. The Linke,
