In “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”, Davidson urges that the dualism of scheme and content is the third dogma of empiricism, and if we give it up, it is not clear that there is anything distinctive left to call empiricism. Two issues are dealt with in this thesis:
(Q1) Is the dualism is a dogma that we have to abandon?
(Q2) If we do abandon this dualism, do we have to give up empiricism at the
same time?
I shall argue that the answer of (Q1) is affirmative and the one of (Q2) is negative. I think McDowell’s theory could be an example of empiricism without the third dogma. Davidson’s criticism of the dualism of scheme and content makes philosophers reconsider the problems in epistemology on a new base without the dualism.
目　次
緒論 1
第一章 蒯因之前的經驗主義 3
第一節 經驗主義的前兩個里程碑 4
第二節 邏輯實證主義 9
第二章 蒯因的經驗主義 13
第一節 整體主義 13
第二節 沒有教條的經驗主義 15
第三節 自然化的知識論 18
第三章 經驗主義的第三個教條 25
第一節 概念架構、經驗內容以及概念的相對主義 26
第二節 概念架構與經驗內容的二元論 27
第三節 沒有教條的經驗主義 34
第四章 再看經驗主義的第三個教條 37
第一節 蒯因作為一個二元論者的代表 37
第二節 近側理論與遠側理論的爭論 40
第三節 概念架構這個觀念 44
第五章 無中介物的知識論 51
第一節 戴維森的詮釋理論 52
第二節 麥道的最小經驗主義 57
第三節 客觀性要求 60
結語 65
參考書目 67
參考書目
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